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I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced systems such as robots or satellites have an increasing need for a high level autonomy while performing in a bard real-time environment. However, this raises a major non trivial problem: most complex autonomous systems, which operate with a minimal human intervention and in a highly non deterministic environment are bard to validate. First because little bas been done in the field of validating autonomous components2, second the increasing number of the functional components, their raising intrinsic complexity and their interactions is becoming a serious concern to be addressed by system architects. Nevertheless, if these autonomous systems are to be seriously considered (e.g. for costly missions or for interacting with humans) one must propose approaches to make them safe and dependable (e.g. avoid non nominal and dangerous system states, which could lead to the loss of mission or to harm humans).
The paper is organized as follow. We present in section II a "classical" autonomous system architecture and the reasons why it is rather difficult to prove safety and dependability of autonomous systems based on this architecture. A solution to address this problem is to introduce a component acting as a "safety bag" [21 to control that it will never let the system engage in inconsistent state. The role and the requirements of this component are further 'OBDD Ordered Binary Deeision Diagram 'This does not mean that they are inhinsically harder to didate than mdiuonal pm-.
Bul various rcd w r i d expiences [I] show lhal the Vust people put in lhese eompanents is, as of today, rather limited detailed in section III. The Request & Resource Checker -presented in section IV -is specified according to these requirements. It is supported by a formal representation of the system described step by step in section V. This model is used to specify the constraints of the system and to generate the corresponding controller based on an OBDD like data structure described briefly in section VI. Section W presents some encouraging experimental results on one of our robotic platforms. We then conclude and present wme of the prospectives opened by this work.
11. AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS: THE COMPLEXITY DILEMMA An autonomous robot is commonly seen as a system integrating perception and action in a dynamic environment and, most important, deliberative capabilities, with minimal human supervision. These systems make an increasing use of advanced and complex techniques in order to enhance their robustness to environment variability. . _ . .
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Decisional Level: This level centralizes the high level decisional capabilities of the system. It may embeds a number of components such as (but not limited lo): a planner, which produces high level plans to achieve goals, and an executive which decomposes and relines plans into atomic actions executable by functional components.
Functional Level: This level, controlled by the decisional one, includes all the basic system functionalities (sensors, effectors, . . . ) and processing (motion planning, image processing, . . . ). It may be organized into modular components including a set of services corresponding to one particular functionality or to a physical component On one hand, the decisional level provides some high level decision-making capabilities, however such capabilities require a global and somewhat abstract view of the system. Indeed, the complexity of the overall system cannot reasonably be globally encompassed by the planner or the executive. As a consequence, the model used at this level must remain at a level of abstraction low enough to enable the system to reason about it in an acceptable time, while being high enough to make their use non trivial. However, using such high level partial model in say the planner is bound to lead to plans which lint need to be rehed using yet another partial model (for example a refinement procedure) and at a lower level. This aggregation of partial and independent models (actions planning, procedures, etc) leads to an overall incompleteness of the set of the states covered by the models, and thus to unforeseen interactions or execution traces which can be harmful to the system. To take an example, if one consider a plan produces by a planner, while being perfectly valid with respect to the actions model used by the planner; its execution through a procedural executive providing parallel procedures execution may lead to unexpected effects due to the interactions between the resulting commands issued by this executive.
Another point to consider with respect to decisional components is their growing complexity. Some of these twls offer functionalities like planning under uncertainty, executing leamed policies, least committed plans or l e ming abilities. The introduction of such techniques provide an increased robustness to environment variability but makes these components far more complex to validate. We are then unable to certify that such program will never trigger an action in a particular state which may lead to an unwanted system states.
On the other hand, the functional level embeds modules with little decisional capabilities and close to the hardware and to the environment. Moreover, to increase the modularity of this layer, and the re-usability of these modules, each of them is developed independently and has linle knowledge about the others. As a consequence, they are not aware of conRicts or unforeseen interactions which may arise. Moreover, two or more modules may exchanges data (one producer, and one consumer) through link created by the executive. For example, let us consider an example with two modules:
1) The arm module conmls the arm of the robot and can receive commands to stow or unstow the arm.
2) The locomotion module is used to get the robot moving. Both modules have been developed independently, stiu the overall design is such that at no time, the robot should move while its ann is not in the stowed position. It is clear that from each module point of view nothing a priori prevents it to accept an unstowed request (respectively a move request) while the robot is moving (respectively while the ann is an unstowed position).
Similarly, one could consider a third module morion control which produces a speed reference (e.g. from a motion planner uajectory) executed by the locomotion module (through a data flow link established by the executive). If both locomotion and motion control modules have been developed independently and are indeed used on various platforms, one can imagine that they are both accepting to producehe a wide range of speed. For a particular robot in a particular environment though, it is clearly inappropriate to allow an arbitraq range of speed. For example a speed of 50n.sK' may be acceptable in a flat terrain for a regular ATRV but not in a rough terrain. W e such constraint may not hold for an UMV like vehicle.
Lasr for an autonomons robot, it is usually impossible to make sufficient simulation tests to cover the high variability of the environment and the different situations that may occur. So when the real system will be deployed, it is hounded to mu in unforeseen and untested situations.
Still, autonomous robots are intended for missions where safety and dependability is critical: they may have to interact directly with humans (museum guide, nurse robot, . . . ) or they may have to perform missions in dangerous or still unreachable environments (to the human) where any mistake could have dramatic consequences (nuclear plants, extraterrestrial exploration, . . . ). Even if high level decision capabilities and complex functional level are the key to achieve these ambitious goals, autonomy will remain largely unused if the software architecture does not offer reasonable safety and dependability. The solution we propose is based on an execution control presented in the next section.
EXECUTION CONTROL
The main idea supporting execution control is to offer a component that controls the system will never reach an inconsistent state. It is a fault protection system acting as a filter or "safety bag" [2] . It captures all events that can change the system state (request of services, . . .) and checks if they do not lead into a prohibited state. Then it eventually proposes alternate actions (rejecting requests, killing services, suspending processes, . . .) to keep the system consistent.
In this paper, we sbaU consider that the functional level is composed with a set of modules, each of them offering a set of services. These services can be launched by a request with arguments, they can normally terminate or can he killed. In any case, a report is sent to the requester giving information about the action (success, failure, specific information, . . . ). On the top of this clienthewer protocol, we also assume that services can provides data flows exporting informations to other programs (modules or decisional components).These assumptions are clearly not over constraining with respect to the classical architecture used for autonomous systems, for example:
. In the LAAS architecture 131 services are activated by requests and may export data to "posters" offering data exchange between the modules and other components. In CLARAty [41 functional modules are object instances, then we can consider that a method call is a request for a service and public amibutes may be viewed as data flows.
To control efficiently this functional level, the execution
Observability: The component must have the ability to monitor and catch all events that may lead or participate to a system inconsistency. Indeed, the execution control requires this information to properly monitor the evolution of the system. controller must respect some basic requirements:
Controllability: The execution control must be able to control the system (i.e. block or deny commands) to avoid inconsistent states. If this requirement is not validated then there is no way to avoid these states.
. Synchronous ond Bounded cycle time: The component must act under a synchronous hypothesis (i.e. computation and communication take virtually no time). Apart from avoiding asynchronous formalism difficulties, this allows us to have a cleaner formal model of the system behavior and state transitions. In a practical way, this implies that the system will run as a loop with a bounded cycling time, offering, by this way, guarantees on the overall system reactivity.
. Verifiability: The execution control component has to offer a formalism and a representation that allow the developer to check if it safely controls the system behavior.
As the decisional components control the functional ones, the execution control component takes place naturally as an interface between these two layers. Our experience has proven that it is not sufficienr indeed the interaction between modules is also done by data flows between them created by the decisional level. For example the motion execution module reads the speed vectors from another module computing the path to get to the next way point. The decisional level just manages the creation and desmction of these data flows but does not explicitly see the exchanged data. So the execution control component also needs to monitor the interactions between the functional components. Thus it fits in between the decisional level and functional level as well as between the functional modules which interact between each other.
A. State of the Arl in Execution Control
Many of these concerns are not new, and some autonomous system architechues address them in one way or another.
Indeed, some of the requirements presented above were clearly fulfilled hy a previous version of the LAAS architecNre 131 based on the KHEOPS system [51. KHEOPS is a tool for checking a set of propositional rules in realtime. A KHEOPS program is thus a set of production rules (condition(s) i actim(s)), from which a decision m e is built. The main advantage of such a representation is the guaranty of a maximum evaluation time (corresponding to the decision DAG' depth). However, the KHEOPS language is not adapted to resource checking and appears to be quite cumbersome to use.
Another interesting approach to prove various formal propenies of robotics system is the ORCCAD system [61.
This development environment, based on the ESTEREL [7] language, provides extensions to specify robots "tasks" and "procedures". However, this approach does not address architecture with advanced decisional level such as planners.
In [XI, the authors propose a system based on a modelbased approach. The objective is to abstract the system in a state transitions based language abstracting the dependability concerns. The programmers specify state evolutions with invariants and a controller will execute this maintaining these invariants. To do that the controller estimates the most likely current state -using observation and a probabilistic model of physical components -and find the most dependable sequence of commands to reach speci6ed goal (i.e. with a minimum failure probability) 3DAG Directed Acyclic Graph.
In [9], the authors present another work related to synchronous language which has some similarities with the work presented here. The objective is also to develop an execution control system with formal checking tools and a user-friendly language. This system makes use of an abstract representation of services (without explicit representation of arguments nor retumed value). This development environment gives the possibility to validate the resulting automata via model-checking techniques (with SIGALI, a SIGNAL extension).
In [IO] , the authors present the CIRCA SSP planner for hard real-time controllers. This planner synthesizes offline controllers from a domain description (preconditions, postconditions and deadlines of tasks). It can then deduce the corresponding timed automaton to control the system on-line, with respect to these constraints. This automaton can be formally validated with model checking techniques.
In [ l l ] the authors present a system which allows the translation from MPL (Model-based Processing Language) and TDL (Task Description Language) -the executive language of the CLARAty mhitecture[l2] -to SMV, a symbolic model checker language. Compared to our approach, this system seems to be more designed for the high level specification of the decisional level, while our approach focuses on the online checking of the outcomes of the decisional level.
Another approach to consider is IDEA presented in [13]. It relies on two main ideas: ( I ) most components can be seen as agents which share a common virmal machine, defining their reactive planning behavior (planning here bas to be taken in a wide sense);(2) all these agents share parts of a global temporal model which specifies the internal "behavior" of the agent, as well as the communication between agents. The time-lines representation of constraints supporting this architecture seems to be a good model for a formal validation of the system. 
IV. THE REQUEST
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Note: Predicates marked with a are uncontrollablethey correspond to contingent events -as opposed with the predicates marked with a * , which are the RZC possible actions and thus fully controllable. These special predicates give us information about the controllability and observability of services. The amibutes arg and ref are respectively the argument value given to the request of service and the report of the service. As the report can indicate one service instance failure we de6ne the predicate correct taking a retuned value as argument which is m e if and only if the returned value indicates a correct process com letion.
As a process execution has an infPuence on the subse- The past of a service is not sufficient to express all the system evolutions. We also need to have an order relation between service dates, so we can point to the last of the past services. Using the lasi function, we defme this precedence test:
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E. Model for daia paws
Our system must take into account the data flow between services. As presented in section UI, they provide the data sharing mechanism of the system. To allow system specifier to describe these links we define two predicates: produces: P x M 4 {TJ} expressing that a process will be able to write a new value on a data flow; and rend.. P x M 4 {TJ} expressing that a process will probably read one data flow. These two predicates will be used during the system constraints specification phase to express the producers and consumers of one data flow.
C. Constraint specifications
The model previously presented offers a representation based on service instances. It could he interesting to distinguish instances of one service according to their arguments and/or returned values. Indeed these values frequently give information about the service instance behavior. To express them in a general way, we define service classes (classified by constraints applied to these values). These constraints are fixed hypercubes in the domain of arguments and rerumed values of the service.
Let Ca, be the set of constraints we can appl to arguments of s E S, we can define a predicate wLch checks one instance of s satisfying c E Cas is running:
. The resulting StruCNre is a complete factorization of the initial formula. This implies that a predicate value is checked onlv one.
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The generalization of the past of one service with constraints is done adding Cr,, the set of possible constraints we can apply to the returned values of the service s. Then, using the lust function, we can express this service has a past which respects the constraint (ca,a) E Ca, x Cr, with:
posr(s,(ca,cr)) e ( fosr(s)t = ( s , r e t , r ) h ca(argumentof(z)) A m(ret))
We can also extend the ordering predicate and the data flow management with constraints following the method used to extend the past and the running test.
D. System constraint rules
To specify possible conflicts and constraints of the system, we use the formal model presented above to express contexts leading to inconsistent states.
Here is an example of a simple system with two services:
The move service takes a distance and a speed as arguments.
The camera service is able to take images. An argument specifies if we want a high or low resolution picture.
We want to express that we cannot take any ima e in hi? resolution if the robot is moving faster than $5 m.s-. Tlns can be expressed with this formula: mnning(nove, speed > 0.5)tA mnning(camera, mode = high)t) The construction algorithm of one OCRD is quite similar to the OBDD one. It differs on the introduction of predicates which are similar but which have different constraints. In this case the compiler makes a partition of the constraints and split nodes accordingly. An example of such OCRD is given in Fig. 3 .
The main interest of the OCRD data structure is that the resulting diagram is strictly equivalent to an OBDD.
In fact it is an OBDD where each variable corresponds to one partition of the state space of the system. As a consequence OCRDs keep the properties of OBDDs 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented and integrated the RZC on the LAAS architecm[31 and the results are quite encouraging. The platform for our experimentation -Dala, our ATRV robot -is based on the architecture instantiation represented partially in Fig. 4 . This robot embeds modules managing the following functions:
. Camera manages the stereo bench. . SCorrel computes a stereo correlation to from the stereo bench images.
. STEO.uses SCorrel outputs to deduce the robot position. The role of the R2C is to maintain this formula true in all the states of the system. Using the definitions of the running predicate we can decompose this formula into atomic predicates including the controllable ones (i.e. rejectes and k i l l e s ) applied to move and camera requests . L~~ maintains a 3D map of the , p 3~ computes a motion plan based on a 3~ repre. sentation of the environment and its goal position.
. p l a h e controls the camera pan/tilt . EX manaeeS the wheels and the odometrv " data. POM is a module producing the best position estimate according to positions produced by other modules and their precision. instances satisfying the constraints.
To maintain this formula true, the R2c manages the conmllable predicate values (i.e. setting them to the proper value). In this case it can reject or kill service instances of move or camera when incoming events threaten the formula
To express these constraints in a more "human legible"
representation, we have developed a language and its compiler named EXOGEN [161.
VI. MAINTAINING CONSTRAINT RUI.ES I N REAL-TIME
The previous section shows that the RZC may be seen as a component maintaining a formula m e . Still, such ap roach is reasonable in our context if and only if the hypothesis "acceptable". The approach we propose to satisfy this requirement is to use Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs, see [151) . This graph based data strucNre expresses logical formnlas with the following properties: R P C deductions are fast enough to keep the synchronous . ...
We have extracted for this system 13 constraints rules representing all the contlicts and faulty interactions between 14 services. For example, one constraint we have specified for the POM module specifies that a position cannot be read from this module if we have not connected this one to any position producer.
The resulting OCRD bas a maximum depth of 22 with a total size of 399 nodes. The R2C traversing this graph has a maximom cycle time of 300ps. The overall system reactivity is kept (the global system cycle is approximatively around 100 ms). We have tried to inject many situations threatening these constraints and all of these are %€KD: Ordered Consmined Rules Diagram. reported tu the executive. Cnfununarely. as o f today, the executtvc has not k e n p r u g r m e d to take into xcount lhis kind of messages. Moreover i t i s rather simple to consider these messages a i a service failure and tu react accordingly.
vI11. CON(:I.L1SIOS AND PI:K$I*l'C I'IVI:S
In lhii paper, we show that iu1 auiononiou\ rohot cannot offer d e t y g u m t e e s without esecution ConUuI. We propuce a solution bawd on a s)nchronour model supponed hy a specification o f controllable and obiermhle events of thc \y,tem.
The R2C is a quitc siniple, but yet pnwen'ul. component impleuienting this solution It uses a general riiodel of the funcuonal level to wpervire ils state changes.
Tu control and avoid inconsistent late\ in real-time. the R'C is supponzd hy a data structure \imiIar Io OBDD. named OCRD. which encodes the acceptable dates of the s)stem. .The rerulring diagrm has a limited depth and thus provider ti real tlme guaranty on its maximum evaluation time. As we ure an appmnch similar to OBDDs, we expert to be able IO use model cliecking tools to validate some more complex temporal propmies uf the R'C.
Ihe R'C i s currently integrated in the LAAS arclutccture md our lint tests show that it performs efficiently on our niobile rohots. Still, the current version due\ not haw a complete view on the stale chmngc as it just caprurcs events coming from the control Aow o f the system (requesls/repunsl and not the data exchangzd by d;lW flow (po\ters read&.
We we currently adding this feature to thc latest version of the R2C. Anuther possible extmiion is to enhance the decisional cum onenls to t h e into account the repuns coming from thr R' C, i.e. how to recnver from ii rejecred ur killed request. Finally. we plan to tnve,tigate existing model checkers approache\ (hased on OBDD, to see if they can bring some new ad\,anwge% tn this system. 
